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Collective Bargaining in the Public 
Service of Canada 
John C. Anderson 
and 
Thomas A. Kochan 
This paper examines the existing System of collective 
bargaining in the Public Service of Canada and the législative 
suggestions of the Parliamentary Committee on Employer-
employée Relations in the Public Service in light ofthe results 
oftwo major empirical investigations of collective bargaining 
in the fédéral public service of Canada. 
In 1967, after almost three years of préparation, a bill providing 
fédéral public employées with the right to collective bargaining was 
given royal assent. The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA), 
along with amendments to other relevant législation was designed as: 
...a measure to provide for the establishment of a system of collective bar-
gaining applicable to employées of the public service of Canada, and for the 
resolution of disputes that may arise in the negotiation or conclusion of col-
lective agreements applicable to such employées; to establish a process for 
the présentation of grievances of employées arising in conjunction with 
their employment, and to establish a system for the adjucation of grievances 
of employées; to provide for the establishment of a board, to be known 
as the Public Service Staff Relations Board, which shall be responsible for 
the administration of said measure, and to provide further to the constitu-
tion and appointment of such authorities, officers, and employées as required 
in connection with the administration of said measure.2 
Thus, a framework was established 
to provide for the negotiation and 
administration of collective agree-
ments for fédéral employées. 
Since the passage of that légal 
framework 104 bargaining units hâve 
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1
 The research on which this article was based was supported by a research 
contract from Treasury Board, Government of Canada to the first author. The opinions 
and interprétation contained in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not 
necessarily represent those of Treasury Board. 
2
 Jacob Finkelman, «Public Service Staff Relations Act,» Canadian Labour, 
(September, 1968), p. 28. 
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negotîated some 449 agreements wïth Treasury Board and the « separa-
te» employées in the fédéral sector.3 During the past few years, this 
system has corne under scrutiny and a number of recommendations for 
changes in public policy hâve been advanced. Specifically, Jacob Fin-
kelman, chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board has issued 
a multi-volume report4 which served as the basis for the final recommen-
dations of the Parliamentary Committee on Employer-Employée Rela-
tions in the Public Service.5 The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the existing system and the législative suggestions of that committee 
in light of the results of two major empirical investigations of collective 
bargaining in the fédéral public service of Canada. The first study exam-
ined the déterminants of the outcomes of contracts negotiated during the 
first four rounds of bargaining under the PSSRA.6 The second assessed 
the performance of the impasse resolution procédures across thèse four 
rounds.7 We will draw heavily on the results of thèse two studies in 
developing our recommendations for changes in public policy. In doing 
so we will comment on the merits and limitations of the Finkelman 
Report and the Parliamentary Committee recommendations. 
It is not our intention to deal with ail recommendations of the 
committee or for that matter ail aspects of the system8 but rather to 
3
 Government of Canada, Report to Parliament of the Spécial Joint Committee 
on Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service (Ottawa: Information Canada, 
1976). 
4
 Jacob Finkelman, Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service of 
Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974); for a rationale behind the report and 
synopsis see, J. Finkelman, «Report on Employer-Employée Relations in the Public 
Service of Canada,» Relations Industrielles, Vol. 30, no. 1, 1975, pp. 155-119. 
5
 Government of Canada, op. cit. 
6
 John C. Anderson, Characteristics of the Environment, Organization, and 
Bargaining Process in Relation to Bargaining Outcomes in the Fédéral Public Service 
of Canada, Final Report to Treasury Board Secrétariat, Government of Canada, Ottawa, 
March, 1976. This study and the one below are based on an analysis of the expériences 
of 49 of the 72 bargaining units negotiating with Treasury Board. Only units with over 
500 members were examined to ensure availability of other data. This results in an 
underrepresentation of units in the scientific and professional category. 
7
 John C. Anderson and Thomas A. Kochan, «Dispute Resolution in the 
Canadian Fédéral Service: Impacts on the Bargaining Process,» Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1977. 
8
 For more spécifie descriptions of the various aspects of the fédéral industrial 
relations system see: Harold W. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining by Public Employées 
in Canada: Five Models (Ann Arbor: Institute of labor and Industrial Relations, 1971); 
Shirley Goldenberg, «Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector: The Canadian Scène,» 
Relations Industrielles, vol. 28, no. 2, 1973, pp. 267-292; A. Aggarwal, «Adjudication 
of Grievances in the Public Service of Canada,» Relations Industrielles, Vol. 28, no. 3, 
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focus more intensively on four features of the industrial relations Sys-
tem: (1) the bargaining structure, (2) the scope of bargainable issues, 
(3) the dispute resolution process, and (4) the complementary institu-
tions to collective bargaining. Furthermore, our recommendations are 
based only on the expérience of units negotiating with the Treasury 
Board actïng as the employer and not any of the « separate » employers 
as defined in Part II of schedule I of the PSSRA. 
BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
Concurrently with the development of the PSSRA, the Public 
Service Commission (then the Civil Service Commission) was charged 
with the responsibility of establishing a new government wide job clas-
sification system. The seventy-two occupational groups defined within 
this plan were classified into five occupational catégories — operational, 
administrative support, technical, administrative and foreign service, 
and scientific and professional. The occupational groups then became 
the statutorily defined bargaining units. This System of a multitude of 
occupationally (craft) based bargaining units was designed to recognize 
the unique interests of each group and their right to pursue those in-
terests through collective bargaining. 
Finkelman's report recommended the (1) merger of existing bar-
gaining units where a single bargaining agent represented ail units or 
(2) coalition bargaining in situations where more than one bargaining 
agent represented the units involved so long as it was mutually agreed 
upon by the union(s) and the employer.9 Thèse recommendations were 
not adopted, however, by the parliamentary committee. 
The results of our research show that a substantial standardization 
of provisions of collective agreements exists across ail occupational 
1973, pp. 497-547; Robert Des Lauriers and N. Parekh, « Productivity and Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada,» Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual 
Meetings of the Industrial Relations Research Association (Madison, Wisconsin: 
Industrial Relations Research Association, 1972), pp. 221-226; A. Kliengartner, «Col-
lective Bargaining by Professionals in Fédéral Employment in Canada,» Proceedings 
of the Twenty-fourth Annual Meetings of the Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1972), pp. 379-
386; and A. G. Gillespie, «The Public Service Staff Relations Board,» Relations In-
dustrielles, vol. 30, no. 4, 1975, pp. 628-640. Other relevant research is cited below. 
9
 J. Finkelman, Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service of Canada, 
op. cit. 
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groups and especially within each of the five major occupational cat-
égories. It appears that ail agreements hâve a séries of basic provisions 
and that other clauses vary by occupational category. For example 
whereas operational groups hâve contracts which include various types 
of pay suppléments for the type of work performed (e.g., driving duty), 
the scientific and professional category hâve a séries of leave provisions 
related to éducation and career development. Some variance from the 
norm exists for each category. This fact in itself suggests that the groups 
hâve not pursued « unique » interests but rather that bargaining agents 
hâve attempted to maximize benefîts across groups (but possibly within 
occupational catégories) and to minimize internai political problems for 
union leaders that inevitably arise out of «coercive comparisons. » 
Several policy implications arise from thèse conclusions. Collective bar-
gaining could more efficiently be carried out on an occupational category 
basis. Alternatively, a master agreement could be negotiated for issues 
with service wide applicability supplemented by subsidiary agreements 
at the occupational category level. Merger of existing bargaining units 
or coalition bargaining would présent few problems in the scientific and 
professional, administrative and foreign service, and administrative sup-
port catégories where one or a few unions represent ail groups and 
employée interests are similar. However, it is less likely to succeed 
in the technical and operational catégories where many unions, both 
private and public sector, with major différences in philosophy exist. 
Thus, any change in the law must allow for flexibility of choice. 
The major costs of this type of consolidation would be to (1) 
increase the potential scope and impact of any single work stoppage or 
arbitration award, and (2) move the level of bargaining further away 
from the rank and file and the department administrators affected by 
the agreement. A two tiered system with occupational suppléments can 
deal with the second problem quite effectively, however, the first 
négative effect is less easily overcome. The redundant bargaining and 
whipsawing encouraged and institutionalized in the current structure, 
however, argue for the need for some structural reform along the lines 
recommended above. 
THE SCOPE OF BARGAINABLE ISSUES 
One of the most contentious issues in public sector collective bar-
gaining has been related to what issues should be considered mandatory 
subjects of bargaining. This has been especially true with regard to the 
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«merit» principle usually enforced by a civil service commission.10 
At présent, the PSSRA provides that negotiations may not deal with 
any issues upon which agreement would require the altération of exist-
ing législation, other than for the purpose of appropriation of funds. 
In effect, this seriously limits the scope of bargainable topics, as it 
removes from the arena of collective bargaining such items as pensions 
(Public Service Superannuation Act), appointment, appraisal, promo-
tion, demotion, transfer, layoff and release of employées (Public Service 
Employment Act), workmen's compensation (Government Employée's 
Compensation Act), and those subjects of the Government Vessel Dis-
cipline Act. In addition, the right and authority to détermine organiza-
tion, to assign duties, and to classify positions remains with the em-
ployer. Thus, many issues central to collective bargaining in the 
private sector are outside the domain of collective bargaining in the 
public service. 
Further limitations to the scope of bargaining exist depending on 
the dispute resolution method chosen by the bargaining unit. Arbitrators 
are only allowed to make awards on rate of pay, hours of work, 
leave entitlements, standards of discipline and other terms and condi-
tions related directly thereto. Moreover, no issues not requested as a 
subject of an award can be dealt with by the arbitrator. No such restric-
tions exist on the conciliation board. 
Neither Finkelman's report nor the report of the Parliamentary 
Committee hâve recommended much substantive change in the législa-
tion governing scope of bargaining. Instead, the committee recommends 
that the rôle of the Public Service Commission, its relationship to Trea-
sury Board, the PSSRB, government departments and agencies be the 
subject of a task force study. Thus, no immédiate changes are foreseen 
with subjects under its control. Two issues are isolated to be made 
bargainable ; the relative worth of jobs within an occupational group 
(one aspect of classification) and the impact and notice of technological 
change. However, no strike or lockout may resuit from negotiation over 
thèse issues. Furthermore, if thèse issues are written into collective 
agreement they are to be considered spécial agreements with their own 
duration. 
It is difficult to assess the scope of bargaining or thèse particular 
recommendations within the framework of our research. However, 
10
 See for example, F. Helburn and N. Bennett, «Public Employée Bargaining 
and the Merit Principle,» Labor Law Journal, vol. 23, no. 9, 1972, pp. 618-629. 
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several issues and conséquences of a narrow scope of bargaining lead 
to important implications for public policy. 
After the third round of negotiations, the majority of collective 
agreements contained provisions covering ail issues considered bar-
gainable. Furthermore, since the inception of bargaining few clauses 
hâve been changed or added to the contracts (major exceptions being: 
maximum vacations, standby pay, shift differential, removal of spécial 
leave from administrative support category, and wording changes in 
existing provisions). This leaves the bargaining units in a situation where 
the only trade-offs possible for wage demands are wording changes in 
non-wage provisions. This results in tremendous pressure on bargaining 
agents to obtain wage increases through whatever means necessary 
(strike, politics, etc.). For this reason alone more serious considération 
should be given to increasing the scope of bargaining. 
Conspicuous by its absence in either the Finkelman or the Com-
mittee reports is a discussion of différences in the scope of bargaining 
under the arbitration and conciliation board/strike routes. Barnes and 
Kelley hâve noted that arbitrators hâve denied jurisdiction over many 
issues presented to the tribunal under the directly related thereto por-
tion of the section 70(1) of the PSSRA. This has had the effect of nar-
rowing even further the number of issues considered arbitrable. Thus, 
in the last two rounds of bargaining there has been a significant switch 
from the arbitration to the conciliation board/strike routes. The différent 
scope of bargaining in the two routes may partially account for this 
switching. Therefore, one possible solution to the perceived inadequa-
cies of the arbitration route is to make the same issues arbitrable as 
bargainable. A more far reaching, although probably less advisable, 
change would be to remove the restriction on arbitrators for only deal-
ing with issues submitted to arbitration. Thèse two changes would clear-
ly increase the comparability of the routes. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The PSSRA11 provides for two alternate dispute «seulement pro-
cesses», the conciliation board/strike or the compulsory arbitration 
route. One of the two methods must be selected prior to giving notice to 
bargain to the employer and can only be altered before notice is given 
for negotiation of a subséquent contract. The sélection cornes into effect 
The majority of this section is based on J. Anderson and T. Kochan, op. cit. 
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when notice is served. For those bargaining units which sélect the con-
ciliation board/strike route, employées or classes of employées may 
be designated as essential to the safety and security of the public and 
as such are not allowed to partake in any légal strike. The two alter-
nate methods were originally established to provide an alternative for 
the weaker bargaining units without the économie power to strike. 
Several recommendations were made by the parliamentary com-
mittee in référence to dispute resolution. None of them, however, make 
any substantive change in the current procédure. In order to protect 
the public interests, the Committee recommended that while pariiament 
is not in session the Governor-General in Council should hâve the 
right to suspend the right to strike. Moreover, an inquiry commission 
may be appointed in the case of an impasse. It is also recommended 
that the définition of designated employée be extended to include situa-
tions where there is a threat to public health, ongoing experiments, 
physical treasures and the level of température in public buildings. In 
addition, désignations are to be permanent rather than negotiated at 
each round of bargaining and lists of designated employées are to be 
filed and updated regularly with the PSSRB. Finally, prosecution for 
unlawful activities are to be strengthened and violations are to be heard 
before the PSSRB. However, it was also recommended that a spécial 
commission be established with the power to independently initiate légal 
action against employées, employée organizations, or employers where 
violations hâve occurred. Thus, the proposed policy changes appear 
to be designed to strengthen or reinforce the limits on the right to 
strike in the existing system. 
Our research suggests several problems with the existing dual 
impasse resolution system which are not dealt with within the report of 
proposed changes to the PSSRA. The following gênerai conclusions 
were reached: (1) there is a significant trend of switching from the 
arbitration to the conciliation strike routes ; (2) 69% of those who hâve 
switched did so after having an arbitral award issued in the previous 
round of bargaining ; (3) there was a significant decrease across the four 
rounds of bargaining in settlements reached without resort to third 
party assistance, 79.4%, 49.2%, 44.9% and 21.9% respectively; (4) there 
was a significant increase in the percentage of units settling in arbi-
tration over the four rounds of bargaining, 3.4%, 32.5%, 33.3% and 
53.8% respectively; (5) the conciliation and médiation steps were much 
more effective in reaching settlements under the conciliation board/ 
strike route than under the arbitration route ; (6) there was an increase 
in the use of the strike over time, 1.5%, 2.0%, 6.1% and 9.4% respec-
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tively;12 (7) the probability of going to impasse was greater if the 
bargaining unit had gone to impasse in the previous round of bargain-
ing (narcotic effect); and (8) wage settlements under arbitration dé-
cisions tended to be within a narrower percentage range than those 
settled without arbitration. 
Ail of thèse results indicate a marked détérioration of the dispute 
resolution System has occurred over time. Clearly, some action should 
be taken to deal with the underlying causes of the détérioration. 
First, it appears that there is some disillusionment with the arbitration 
procédures. The différence in the range of bargainable issues has been 
suggested as one explanation for this phenomenon. The unwillingness 
of arbitrators to deal with innovative issues, to break from patterns 
established by themselves or other arbitrators or to make wage settle-
ments outside of a narrow percentage range, may ail contribute to the 
switching behavior. Barnes and Kelley hâve also suggested that time 
delays in issuing arbitral awards, lack of rationale used in arriving at 
awards, and the scope of judicial review of awards also contribute to 
the dissatisfaction with the arbitration procédure.13 Thus, if one ob-
jective is to rekindle interest in the arbitration route we would suggest 
that: (1) the scope of bargaining between the two routes be made equal; 
and (2) rather than permanent panels of arbitration tribunal members, 
the arbitrator or tripartite board should be selected ad hoc at the time 
of impasse, with the power to deal with ail issues relevant to the dis-
pute. Thèse changes may help to alleviate problems associated with 
lack of innovativeness and scope of bargainable issues. 
In addition to revitalizing the arbitration route, some steps need 
to be taken to reverse the gênerai détérioration of the ability of the 
dispute resolution system to achieve settlements without the resort to 
an impasse or without going ail the way through the procédures to an 
arbitration award or a strike. The choice of an impasse procédure and 
the décision of whether or not to use any procédure are usually con-
sidered stratégie alternatives availabie to the parties in their arsenal of 
bargaining weapons. The uncertainty associated with not knowing the 
final stage of settlement places pressure on the parties to settle in the 
early stages of the impasse procédure. Moreover, where the costs (not 
12
 When only considering those units selecting the conciliation board/strike 
route rather than ail units, the percentages vary slightly; 11.1%, 11.1%, 30.0%, 16.7% 
across the four rounds respectively. 
13
 L.W.C.A. Barnes and L. A. Kelly, Interest Arbitration in the Fédéral 
Public Service of Canada (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, Industrial Relations 
Centre, 1975). 
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financial) of going ail the way to the final step (i.e., strike or arbitration) 
are high, there is a greater incentive to settle without impasse or at 
least to settle prior to this final step. If the above contentions are true, 
then it appears that the sélection of final dispute resolution method 
prior to the commencement of bargaining may be a contributing factor 
to the increased usage of arbitration tribunals and the reliance on third 
in gênerai. Therefore, allowing the sélection of arbitration or the right 
to strike after the initial conciliatory or médiation steps may decrease 
the reliance on arbitration and increase the inducement for the parties 
to settle on their own.14 
It should be noted that this alternative presently exists under 
section 89 of the PSSRA, which allows the parties by mutual consent to 
make the report of a conciliation board binding prior to its issuance. 
However, this provision has ne ver been used. This may be a resuit of 
the reluctance of one or both parties to make such an agreement. 
A final note on the methods of dispute resolution pertains to the 
right to strike. The report of the Parliamentary Committee recommends 
no removal of the right to strike while at the same time it suggests 
significantly increasing the numbers and types of désignations allowed 
under the Act. Furthermore, it strengthens the penalties for violations 
by designated employées. In many cases, more than 90% of the em-
ployées of a given bargaining unit are designated. This seriously cir-
cumscribes any right to strike or the ability to use that right. Further-
more, this policy has resulted in only the most powerful units (those 
able to impose the greatest costs on the employer and the public), 
with the necessary financial strength to survive a strike (and the fines) 
actually going on strike. Thus, in contrast to the policies in some U.S. 
states where the right to strike is granted to nonessential but withheld 
from essential services, the PSSRA has fostered strikes in essential 
services.15 More attention needs to be paid to what proportion of indi-
14
 This alternative is now available to public employées in British Columbia 
and New Brunswick. 
15
 The définition of safety and security of the public is difficult at best. How-
ever, désignations hâve not seemed to follow any systematic pattern in the past and the 
recommendations contained in the committee report blur the distinction even further. It 
is interesting to note that no employées of the post office appear to be considered 
essential while thèse recommendations would resuit in significant désignations for the 
heating, power, and stationary group. It is unclear that température levels in public 
buildings are more important to the safety and security of the public than the économie 
dependence of many individuals and organizations on the mail. This is not to say that 
either should hâve a particular level of désignations, but rather that the définition 
of designatable employée needs to be specified further. 
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viduals constitutes a reasonable component in order to protect the 
safety and security of the public. The policy recommended by the 
Committee would make the strike only a token right. 
COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The fédéral industrial relations System includes two institutions 
which act in conjunction with the collective bargaining process: The 
Pay Research Bureau and The National Joint Council. 
Pay Research Bureau16 
The Pay Research Bureau (PRB) was established in 1957 as a 
unit of the Civil Service Commission but with the passage of the PSSRA 
it was transferred under the administrative jurisdiction of the PSSRB. 
This move was designed to facilitate and accentuate the independence 
and objectivity of the Bureau. The PRB's mandate is to collect infor-
mation on rates of pay, employée earnings, conditions of employment 
and related practices both inside and outside the public service in 
order to meet the needs of the parties to collective bargaining.17 
The objectives are implemented and achieved through the Advisory 
Committee on Pay Research whose rôle it is «to advise on the scope, 
priority, and other aspects, of the Bureau's work, in préparation for 
collective bargaining».18 The Committee is comprised of représentatives 
of the employers and employée organizations. Through this Committee, 
an attempt is made to assure objectivity in sampling and analysis 
of data from comparable groups in the private sectors. 
The Committee recommended that the PRB continues in its présent 
form and continues to perform its présent functions. However, the 
Bureau is to be defined and included within the PSSRA and is to take 
action to gain more visibility for its activities, méthodologies, infor-
mation and reports. No other recommendations were forwarded by the 
Parliamentary Committee. 
The notion of comparability of public employées with employées 
in similar private sector occupations is deeply imbedded in the philo-
16
 For a more complète discussion of the Pay Research Bureau see, Félix 
Quinet, «The Rôle of Research in Centralized Bargaining: The Pay Research Bureau», 
Relations Industrielles, Vol. 26, no. 1, 1971, pp. 202-212. 
17
 Ibid., p. 206. 
18
 Ibid., p. 207. 
18
 Ibid., p. 207. 
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sophy of fédéral wage détermination. Comparability is a major criteria 
delineated for arbitrators in making their décisions.19 A heavy respon-
sibility lies with the PRB in providing data on comparability to the 
parties for collective bargaining purposes. The burden is even stronger 
when private sector wage data are provided by the PRB. Since private 
sector comparable wages were found to be the strongest independent 
predictor of occupational group wage levels.20 Moreover, having a 
comparable group (defined as the availability or existence of PRB re-
ports) was significantly related to the stage at which bargaining units 
settled within the impasse procédure and whether they went to impasse 
or not.21 Given the importance of the data it is obviously imperative 
to guarantee the objectivity and independence of the Pay Research 
Bureau. Therefore, further évaluation of the Bureau and its activities 
should be under taken at this time in an attempt to further specify its 
procédures and the desired rôle of the PRB data in actual négociations. 
Fogel and Lewin hâve raised several criticisms of the use of wage 
comparability as the only criteria in making comparisons between the 
private and public sectors.22 Not only wages but job security, hours of 
work and other benefits differ between thèse two sectors. Thus in order 
to provide more accurate comparative data, the PRB should expand its 
survey coverage to a total compensation approach rather than being 
limited to wages. However, it must be recognized that instituting this 
recommendation would accentuate even further the need for objectivity 
on the part of the Bureau and on effective consultative mechanism for 
making décisions of appropriate samples and survey coverage. 
National Joint Council23 
Not ail terms and conditions of employment are established by 
collective bargaining or under existing législation (PSEA or PSSA). 
The joint consultation process also plays an important rôle in the Public 
Service of Canada. In 1944, the National Joint Council (NJC) was 
established as a consultative body by an Order-in-Council. The consti-
tution of this body provides that at no time shall the number of em-
19
 Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 68. 
20
 J. Anderson, op. cit., p. 80. 
21
 J. Anderson and T. Kochan, op. cit., p. 20. 
22
 W. Fogel and D. Lewin, «Wage Détermination in the Public Sector,» 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1974, pp. 410-431. 
23
 For a more complète description of the National Joint Council see, L.W.C.S. 
Barnes, Consult and Advise : A History of the National Joint Council of the Public 
Service of Canada, 1944-1974, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1975). 
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ployer représentatives exceed the number of représentatives of the 
employée organizations. The body is co-chaired by an elected repré-
sentative of the employée side and an appointed représentative of the 
government who alternately officiate at meetings of the Council. 
Meetings are convened quarterly to cover the necessary business. 
In addition to the quarterly meeting of the total membership of the 
Council, an Administrative Committee, composed of the co-chairmen 
and vice-chairman of the NJC meets once a month and is empowered 
to take action on matters requiring attention before the next full 
meeting. 
With the enactment of the PSSRA in 1967, the issues to be 
considered by this Council were somewhat circumscribed. Until that 
time only pay had been removed from the consultation list. Ail arbi-
trage issues — rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlement, disci-
pline and other terms and conditions related directly thereto — are now 
excluded from the consultation procédure. Classification is also ex-
cluded. Furthermore, those issues which are the subject matter of 
collective bargaining hâve been removed from its jurisdiction. With 
thèse sets of exclusions, it is questionnable as to what subjects are 
within the framework of the consultative mechanism. It has become 
implicitly accepted that bargainable issues which hâve been withdrawn 
from the bargaining table because of their service wide applicability 
(rather than unit specificity) are reasonable matters to be considered 
within this forum. 
No recommendations were presented by the Committee regard-
ing this body. Although our research did not examine the rôle or impact 
of this organization on the collective bargaining process directly, it is 
clear that the functions of this Committee will need to be expanded 
or else it will eventually become a meaningless forum. While one 
alternative might be to allow the Committee to succumb to its natural 
démise, this type of joint structure could, if properly utilized, serve 
several critical functions. It could provide a forum for broad ranging 
discussion and critique of the bargaining system one step removed 
from the day to day battles of the interest groups. It might, for example, 
study the very troublesome problem of innovation by serving as a 
sounding board for proposais that would break new ground or that 
would significantly alter the employment relationship. Union-manage-
ment committees hâve proved useful in certain limited situations in the 
U.S. for dealing with complex problems requiring in-depth study and 
planning, e.g., adjustment to technological change, experiments in 
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improving the quality of work and/or productivity, job évaluation and 
rate restructuring. 
Thus we would see this Committee as having two basic functions : 
(1) the génération and évaluation of new ideas and proposais that 
may help the bargaining and arbitration system adjust to new pressures 
and problems as they surface, and (2) a long term and continuous 
policy évaluation function in which the interested parties can discuss 
policy alternatives in an effort to build greater consensus regarding 
the administration of the current procédure. 
The Committee might even go one step further by engaging in 
studies of spécifie « problematic » bargaining relationships that now exist 
or that develop within the fédéral service. For example, sève rai of the 
bargaining relationships hâve become « addicted » to the use of impasse 
procédures or to strikes since 1967. Perhaps a joint Committee could 
investigate some of the factors causing this pattern and could, because 
of its representational structure, induce changes by the union and 
employer représentatives that would help them to break oui of this 
pattern. 
SOME CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the existing industrial relations policy and 
the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee with respect to 
the structure of bargaining, the scope of bargaining, dispute resolution 
methods, and the complementary institutions to the collective bargain-
ing process. Alternative policy recommendations were made based 
on a study of collective bargaining in the fédéral public service of 
Canada. Some caveats must be added to our discussion and to the 
alternate policy recommendations presented hère. 
First, we hâve not dealt with ail issues which hâve been subjects 
of discussion in the report of the Parliamentary Committee. The topics 
of managerial and confidential exclusions, incompétence, incapacity and 
disciplinary action, union voting procédures, and casual employées 
hâve not been discussed. Our focus was purposely limited to the more 
substantive concerns surrounding the collective bargaining process. 
Second, and more importantly, the recommendations on each of 
the four domains presented hère cannot be taken in isolation. That is, 
changes in policy regarding one issue will hâve an effect on other issues 
whether or not they are altered. Similarly, changes in ail four aspects 
of the system will hâve strong interactive effects. 
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For example, the System of collective bargaining in the fédéral 
public service can be characterized as a séries of internai pattern 
setting and following relationships which occur within and across 
rounds of bargaining. This is mainly because one employer is dealing 
with many bargaining units. Furthermore, the majority of thèse units 
are represented by two unions, the PSAC and PIPS.24 Thus, an increase 
in the scope of bargaining would resuit in hard bargaining to set a new 
standard (or pattern) followed by a diffusion of those gains to other 
bargaining units (tempered by internai relativity différences). However, 
if bargaining was at the occupational category level (a change in bargain-
ing structure) the process by which benefits invariably spread to ail 
groups would be done immediately and thus, it would constitute a 
change in the bargaining process and outcomes. Therefore, the diffu-
sion of new gains (or retrenchments) would be more rapid and less 
whipsawing between groups would occur. In addition, changing the 
time of spécification of impasse resolution method may induce more 
good faith bargaining without a resort to impasse. 
A discussion of the interactions and possible conséquences of ail 
bargaining structure and scope of bargaining (especially under arbitra-
tion) may make the National Joint Council redundant or at least demand 
a re-evaluation of its rôle. 
A discussion of the interactions and possible conséquences of ail 
recommendations is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, a 
delineation of the advantages and disadvantages of each of thèse 
changes to the parties involved must be left to a debate of the unions 
and the employer.25 The suggestions presented hère are made with the 
objective of promoting increased good faith bargaining between the 
parties with a minimum of intervention, unless the public interest is 
truly threatened (another topic of debate). 
The évaluation of public policy and recommendations for changes 
to public policy are an intégral part of the policy-making process. The 
spécification of public policy alternatives and the choice between alter-
natives should be based on sound empirical évidence related to expé-
riences under the policy in question. To date, the évaluation and légis-
lative change recommendations hâve been based on the investigations 
of Jacob Finkelman, the chairman of the PSSRB, as well as briefs 
24
 PSAC is the Public Service Alliance of Canada and PIPS is the Professional 
Institute of the Public Service of Canada. 
25
 For example see the policy statements of the Public Service Alliance of 
Canada on coalition bargaining, The Civil Service Review, May 1976, pp. 10-11. 
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presented by interested parties. Evaluation research studies hâve shown 
that programs (or policy) evaluated by individuals intimately familiar 
with the program tend to be evaluated more positively (or more 
negatively in the case of unions ; it dépends on the hidden agendas of 
the party in question) and less change is suggested than when evaluated 
by outside parties.26 Thèse interprétations appear to be valid for the 
présent situation. That is, the changes proposed by the Parliamentary 
Committee on Employer-employée Relations appear to focus on making 
the existing policy more administratively feasible as well as increasing 
the powers available to the PSSRB for ensuring adhérence to the pro-
visions of the Act.27 Conversely, we believe an évaluation of this (or 
any) labor relations statute should ask the question « How can we make 
the law more workable for the process of collective bargaining?» 
or « What changes will best help to achieve our policy objectives ? » 
Thèse questions can only be adequately answered with systematic 
empirical data concerning the relevant aspects of the policy under 
question. 
La négociation collective dans la fonction publique du Canada 
L'article suggère un certain nombre de modifications à la Loi des relations de 
travail dans la fonction publique différentes des recommandations qui ont été faites 
récemment par le comité parlementaire chargé de l'étude des relations de travail entre 
l'État et ses fonctionnaires. Ces recommandations se fondent sur une recherche expé-
rimentale portant sur ce qui délimite les enjeux dans les négociations et le succès du 
système de solution des conflits selon la Loi entre 1967 et 1975. Elles ne touchent que 
les quatre points suivants: le la structure de négociation; 2e le champ d'application de 
la négociation collective ; 3e le processus de règlement des différends ; 4e les organismes 
d'appoint à la négociation collective. 
Au moment de l'entrée en vigueur de la Loi, une classification nouvelle des 
fonctions est entrée en vigueur. Soixante-douze groupes professionnels qui embras-
saient cinq catégories professionnelles formaient les unités de négociation de base en 
1967. Parce que les conventions de ces différents groupes sont aujourd'hui fortement 
uniformisées (principalement à l'intérieur des catégories professionnelles), l'Auteur esti-
me que la négociation serait plus efficace si elle se faisait sur la base des catégories 
professionnelles au moyen de la négociation en cartel ou par le regroupement des unités 
26
 G. Gordon, «Evaluation Research» in Inkeles, A., Coleman, J. and Smelser, 
N. (eds.), Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Cal.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1975), 
pp. 339-362. 
27
 This argument is partially supported by the fact that the intérim report of 
the Parliamentary Committee established the PSSRB, as a full-time rather than a part-
time board. 
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de négociation interprofessionnelles et la négociation d'une convention collective cadre 
complétée par des arrangements locaux. 
Le champ d'application de la négociation est trop resserré pour les unités 
qui choisissent l'option arbitrale comme moyen de règlement des différends comparati-
vement à celles qui choisissent de recourir à la conciliation et à la grève. De l'avis 
de l'Auteur, c'est là le motif pour lequel un plus grand nombre d'unités sont passées 
de l'arbitrage à la conciliation et à la grève. C'est pourquoi aussi il recommande l'éta-
blissement d'un champ d'application identique, quelle que soit la voie qui serait choisie. 
Au fur et à mesure des quatre rondes de négociation depuis 1967, le mécanisme 
de solution des conflits est allé en se détériorant. Aussi, outre l'égalisation du champ 
d'application de la négociation, il conviendrait de modifier le système de sélection des 
arbitres et de déplacer l'option de choix entre la grève et l'arbitrage après le stade de 
la conciliation. 
Enfin, l'Auteur recommande de renforcer les rôles du Bureau de recherche sur 
les salaires et du Conseil mixte national de façon à améliorer la qualité des données, 
d'une part, et de constituer un forum qui favorise, d'autre part, un dialogue suivi et l'étu-
de de la performance du régime de négociation. 
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